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Abstract
In this paper, we initiate a study on optimal control problem for
stochastic differential games under generalized expectation via backward
stochastic differential equations and partial information. We first prove
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1 Introduction
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the form:
dX(t) = b(t,X(t), u0(t))dt+ σ(t,X(t), u0(t))dW (t)
+
∫
R0
γ(t,X(t−), u1(t−, z), z)N˜( dt, dz), t ∈ [0, T ], (1)
X(0) = x ∈ Rn.
Here b : [0, T ] × Rn × K → Rn; σ : [0, T ] × Rn × K → Rn×n and γ :
[0, T ] × Rn × K × R0 → Rn×n are given continuous functions, and W (t) is
n–dimensional Brownian motion, N˜(·, ·) are n independent compensated Pois-
son random measures and K is a given closed subset of Rn. The processes
u0(t) = u0(t, ω) and u1(t) = u1(t, z, ω), ω ∈ Ω are our control processes. We
assume that u0(t), u1(t, z) have values in a given set K for a.a. t, z and adapted
to a given filtration {Gt}t∈[0,T ], where
Gt ⊆ Ft; t ∈ [0, T ].
For example, we could have a delayed information flow of the form
Gt = F(t−δ)+ ; t ∈ [0, T ],
where (t−δ)+ = max(0, t−δ) and δ > 0 is a given constant. We call u = (u0, u1)
an admissible control if (1) has a unique strong solution.
Let f : [0, T ]×Rn×K → R be a continuous function, namely the profit rate,
and h : Rn → R be a concave function, namely the bequest function. If u is an
admissible control we define the performance criterion J(u) by
J(u) = E
[ ∫ T
0
f(t,X(t), u(t)) dt+ h(X(T ))
]
. (2)
Now suppose that the controls u0(t) and u1(t, z) have the form
u0(t) = (θ0(t), pi0(t)); t ≥ 0,
u1(t, z) = (θ1(t, z), pi1(t, z)); (t, z) ∈ [0,∞)× Rn.
We let ΘG and ΠG be given families of admissible controls θ = (θ0, θ1) and
pi = (pi0, pi1), respectively.
Problem 1. The classical partial information zero–sum stochastic differential
game problem is to find (θ∗, pi∗) ∈ ΘG ×ΠG such that
J(θ∗, pi∗) = sup
pi∈ΠG
(
inf
θ∈ΘG
J(θ, pi)
)
. (3)
Such a control (θ∗, pi∗) is called an optimal control (if it exists).
The intuitive idea is that there are two players, I and II. Player I controls
θ := (θ0, θ1) and player II controls pi := (pi0, pi1). The actions of the players
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are antagonistic, which means that between I and II there is a payoff J(θ, pi)
which is a cost for I and a reward for II.
Problem 1 for jumps was studied recently by several authors, e.g. [1], [2], [6],
[8] and references therein. In this paper we study this game in the case when
the performance criterion J(u) in (2) is replaced by a criterion involving risk.
If we interpret risk in the sense of a convex risk measure, it can be represented
as a nonlinear expectation called g–expectation. See [4], [5], [9], [10] and [11]
for more information about this. More precisely, let
g : [0, T ]× Rn × Rn × L2(ν)→ R
be a given convex function such that g is uniformly Lipschitz with respect to
(y, k, l), i.e.,
| g(t, y, k, l)− g(t, y′, k′, l′) |≤ K(| y − y′ | + | k − k′ | + | l − l′ |), (4)
and such that, for each T > 0, (y, k, l) ∈ (Rn × Rn × L2(ν)), g(t, y, k, l) is
progressively measurable.
Let F be a family of FT –measurable random variables ξ : Ω→ Rn, ξ ∈ L2(P)
where T > 0 is a fixed constant. Consider the following backward stochastic
differential equation (BSDE, for short):
dY (t) = −g(t,K(t), L(t, ·))dt+K(t)dW (t) +
∫
R0
L(t, z)N˜(dt, dz), (5)
Y (T ) = ξ.
We then define
Definition 1.1. For each ξ ∈ F, we call
Eg(ξ) := Y (0) (6)
the g–expectation of ξ related to g.
One can show that the map ξ → Eg(ξ) keeps all the properties that E has,
except possibly the linearity. Further, it is clear that when g(·) = 0, Eg is
reduced to the classical expectation E.
With the above defined generalized expectation, we now introduce the fol-
lowing performance functional
Jg(θ, pi) = Eg
[ ∫ T
0
f(t,X(t), u(t)) dt+ h(X(T ))
]
. (7)
We can formulate our problem with generalized expectation as follows
Problem 2. Find (θ∗, pi∗) ∈ ΘG ×ΠG such that
Jg(θ∗, pi∗) = sup
pi∈ΠG
(
inf
θ∈ΘG
Jg(θ, pi)
)
. (8)
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This problem can be expressed in a different way. Let (η(·), ζ(·), β(·, ·)) be
adapted solution of following BSDE:{
dη(t) = −g(t, ζ(t), β(t, ·))dt+ ζ(t)dW (t) + ∫R0 β(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)
η(T ) = ξ(x, θ, pi)
(9)
where
ξ(x, θ, pi) =
∫ T
0
f(t,X(t), u(t))dt+ h(X(T )).
Define {
Y (t) = η(t)− ∫ t
0
f(t,X(t), u(t))dt
K(t) = ζ(t), L(t, z) = β(t, z).
Then (Y (·),K(·), L(·)) is the unique adapted solution of the following BSDE:
dY (t) = −[g(t,K(t), L(t, ·)) + f(t,X(t), u(t))]dt
+K(t)dW (t) +
∫
R0 L(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)
Y (T ) = h(X(T ))
(10)
Thus, our problem can be formulated as follows: The state process (X(t), Y (t))
of our system is described by the following coupled forward-backward stochastic
differential equation (FBSDE):
dX(t) = b(t,X(t), u0(t))dt+ σ(t,X(t), u0(t))dW (t)
+
∫
R0 γ(t,X(t
−), u1(t−, z), z)N˜( dt, dz),
dY (t) = −[g(t,K(t), L(t, ·)) + f(t,X(t), u(t))]dt
+K(t)dW (t) +
∫
R0 L(t, z)N˜(dt, dz),
X(0) = X0, Y (T ) = h(X(T )),
(11)
and the cost function is given of the form:
Jg(θ, pi) = Y (0)
= E
[
h(X(T )) +
∫ T
0
(g(t,K(t), L(t, ·)) + f(t,X(t), u(t)))dt
]
. (12)
The problem is to find u∗ = (θ∗, pi∗) ∈ ΘG ×ΠG such that
Jg(θ∗, pi∗) = sup
pi∈ΠG
(
inf
θ∈ΘG
Jg(θ, pi)
)
. (13)
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we study the partial optimal
control problem for zero–sum stochastic differential games with g–expectations
and we prove a partial information sufficient maximum principle for such a
problem. In Section 3 we generalize our approach to the general case, not
necessarily of zero-sum type, and also give an equilibrium point for nonzero-
sum games. Finally, in Section 4 we apply our results to finance market.
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2 A maximum principle for zero–sum games with
g–expectations
We now present a maximum principle for problem (13).
The Hamiltonian
H : [0, T ]× Rn × Rn × Rn × L2(ν)×K1 ×K2 × Rn × Rn × Rn × L2(ν)
is defined by
H(t, x, y, k, l, θ, pi, µ, ϕ, ψ, φ) = g(t, k, l) + f(t, x, θ, pi)
+ (g(t, k, l) + f(t, x, θ, pi))µ+ b(t, x, θ, pi)ϕ
+ σ(t, x, θ, pi)ψ +
∫
R0
γ(t, x, θ, pi, z)φ(t, z)ν(dz). (14)
We assume that H is differentiable in the variables x, y, k, l. The adjoint
equation in the unknown adapted processes µ, ϕ, ψ, φ is the following FBSDE:
dµ(t) = ∂H∂y (t,X(t), Y (t),K(t), L(t), θ(t), pi(t), µ(t), ϕ(t), ψ(t), φ(, ·))dt
+ ∂H∂k (t,X(t), Y (t),K(t), L(t), θ(t), pi(t), µ(t), ϕ(t), ψ(t), φ(, ·))dW (t)
+
∫
R05lH(t,X(t), Y (t),K(t), L(t), θ(t), pi(t), µ(t), ϕ(t), ψ(t), φ(, ·))N˜(dt, dz),
dϕ(t) = −∂H∂x (t,X(t), Y (t),K(t), L(t), θ(t), pi(t), µ(t), ϕ(t), ψ(t), φ(, ·))dt
+ψ(t)dW (t) +
∫
R0 φ(t, z)N˜(dt, dz),
µ(0) = 0, ϕ(T ) = (1 + µ(T ))h
′
(X(T )),
(15)
where 5lH denotes the gradient (Frechet derivative) of H with respect to l.
With a slight abuse of notation we will let Θ and Π denote given sets of
possible control values of θ(t) and pi(t), t ∈ [0, T ], respectively.
Theorem 2.1. Let (θˆ, pˆi) ∈ ΘG × ΠG with corresponding solutions Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t),
Kˆ(t), Lˆ(t, z), µˆ(t), ϕˆ(t), ψˆ(t), φˆ(t, z) of equations (11) and (15). Suppose that
(The conditional minimum principle)
inf
θ∈Θ
E[H(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), Kˆ(t), Lˆ(t, ·), θ, pˆi(t), µˆ(t), ϕˆ(t), ψˆ(t), φˆ(t, ·))|Gt]
= E[H(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), Kˆ(t), Lˆ(t, ·), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), µˆ(t), ϕˆ(t), ψˆ(t), φˆ(t, ·))|Gt]
= sup
pi∈Π
E[H(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), Kˆ(t), Lˆ(t, ·), θˆ(t), pi, µˆ(t), ϕˆ(t), ψˆ(t), φˆ(t, ·))|Gt]. (16)
(i) Suppose that, for all t ∈ [0, T ], h(x) is concave and
(x, y, k, l, pi)→ H(t, x, y, k, l, θˆ(t), pi, µˆ(t), ϕˆ(t), ψˆ(t), φˆ(t, ·))
is concave. Then
Jg(θˆ, pˆi) ≥ Jg(θˆ, pi), for all pi ∈ ΠG ,
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and
Jg(θˆ, pˆi) = sup
pi∈ΠG
Jg(θˆ, pi).
(ii) Suppose that, for all t ∈ [0, T ], h(x) is convex and
(x, y, k, l, θ)→ H(t, x, y, k, l, θ, pˆi(t), µˆ(t), ϕˆ(t), ψˆ(t), φˆ(t, ·))
is convex. Then
Jg(θˆ, pˆi) ≤ Jg(θ, pˆi), for all θ ∈ ΘG ,
and
Jg(θˆ, pˆi) = inf
θ∈ΘG
Jg(θ, pˆi).
(iii) If both cases (i) and (ii) hold (which implies, in particular, that h is an
affine function), then (θ∗, pi∗) := (θˆ, pˆi) is an optimal control and
Jg(θˆ, pˆi) = sup
pi∈ΠG
(
inf
θ∈ΘG
Jg(θ, pi)
)
= inf
θ∈ΘG
(
sup
pi∈ΠG
Jg(θ, pi)
)
. (17)
Proof. i) Choose (θ, pi) ∈ ΘG × ΠG with corresponding solutions X(t), Y (t),
K(t), L(t, z), µ(t), ϕ(t), ψ(t) and φ(t, z). In the following we write
Hˆ(t) = H(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), Kˆ(t), Lˆ(t, ·), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), µˆ(t), ϕˆ(t), ψˆ(t), φˆ(t, ·)),
H θˆ(t) = H(t,X θˆ(t), Y θˆ(t),K θˆ(t), Lθˆ(t), θˆ(t), pi(t), µˆ(t), ϕˆ(t), ψˆ(t), φˆ(t, ·)),
H pˆi(t) = H(t,X pˆi(t), Y pˆi(t),K pˆi(t), Lpˆi(t), θ(t), pˆi(t), µˆ(t), ϕˆ(t), ψˆ(t), φˆ(t, ·))
and similarly with fˆ(t), f θˆ(t), f pˆi(t) ... etc. Then
Jg(θˆ, pˆi)− Jg(θˆ, pi) = I1 + I2, (18)
where
I1 = E
[ ∫ T
0
(gˆ(t)− gθˆ(t) + fˆ(t)− f θˆ(t))dt
]
and
I2 = E[h(Xˆ(T ))− h(X θˆ(T ))].
By the definition of H we have
I1 = E
[ ∫ T
0
{
Hˆ(t)−H θˆ(t)− (gˆ(t)− gθˆ(t) + fˆ(t)− f θˆ(t))µ(t)
− (bˆ(t)− bθˆ(t))ϕˆ(t)− (σˆ(t)− σθˆ(t))ψˆ(t)
−
∫
R0
(γˆ(t)− γθˆ(t))φˆ(t, z)ν(dz)
}
dt
]
. (19)
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Since µˆ(0) = 0, we can rewrite I2 as following:
I2 = E[h(Xˆ(T ))− h(X θˆ(T )) + (Yˆ (0)− Y θˆ(0))µˆ(0)]. (20)
By the Itoˆ formula, we have
E[(Yˆ (0)− Y θˆ(0))µˆ(0)] = E[(Yˆ (T )− Y θˆ(T ))µˆ(T )]
− E
[ ∫ T
0
{
(Yˆ (t)− Y θˆ(t))dµˆ(t) + µˆ(t)d(Yˆ (t)− Y θˆ(t))
+
∂Hˆ
∂k
(t)(Kˆ(t)−K θˆ(t)) +
∫
R0
5lHˆ(t)(Lˆ(t)− Lθˆ(t))ν(dz)
}
dt
]
= E[(h(Xˆ(T ))− h(X θˆ(T )))µˆ(T )] + I3,
where
I3 =− E
[ ∫ T
0
{
(gˆ(t)− gθˆ(t) + fˆ(t)− f θˆ(t))µ(t) + ∂Hˆ
∂y
(t)(Yˆ (t)− Y θˆ(t))
+
∂Hˆ
∂k
(t)(Kˆ(t)−K θˆ(t)) +
∫
R0
5lHˆ(t)(Lˆ(t)− Lθˆ(t))ν(dz)
}
dt
]
.
By the concavity of h and using the Itoˆ formula again, we get
I2 = E[(h(Xˆ(T ))− h(X θˆ(T )))(1 + µˆ(T ))] + I3
≥ E[(Xˆ(T )−X θˆ(T ))h′(Xˆ(T )(1 + µˆ(T ))] + I3
= E[(Xˆ(T )−X θˆ(T ))ϕˆ(T )] + I3
= E
[ ∫ T
0
{
ϕˆ(t)d(Xˆ(t)−X θˆ(t)) + (Xˆ(t)−X θˆ(t))dϕˆ(t)
+ (σˆ(t)− σθˆ(t))ψˆ(t) +
∫
R0
(γˆ(t)− γθˆ(t))φˆ(t, z)ν(dz)
}
dt
]
+ I3
= E
[ ∫ T
0
{
− ∂Hˆ
∂x
(t)(Xˆ(t)−X θˆ(t)) + (bˆ(t)− bθˆ(t))ϕˆ(t)
+ (σˆ(t)− σθˆ(t))ψˆ(t) +
∫
R0
(γˆ(t)− γθˆ(t))φˆ(t, z)ν(dz)
}
dt
]
+ I3. (21)
Hence
I1 + I2 = E
[ ∫ T
0
{
Hˆ(t)−H θˆ(t)−
(∂Hˆ
∂x
(t)(Xˆ(t)−X θˆ(t))
+
∂Hˆ
∂y
(t)(Yˆ (t)− Y θˆ(t)) + ∂Hˆ
∂k
(t)(Kˆ(t)−K θˆ(t))
+
∫
R0
5lHˆ(t)(Lˆ(t)− Lθˆ(t))ν(dz)
)}
dt
]
. (22)
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On the other hand, since the function
(x, y, k, l, pi)→ H(t, x, y, k, l, θˆ(t), pi, µˆ(t), ϕˆ(t), ψˆ(t), φˆ(t, ·))
is concave, we have
Hˆ(t)−H θˆ(t) ≥ ∂Hˆ
∂x
(t)(Xˆ(t)−X θˆ(t)) + ∂Hˆ
∂y
(t)(Yˆ (t)− Y θˆ(t))
+
∂Hˆ
∂k
(t)(Kˆ(t)−K θˆ(t)) +
∫
R0
5lHˆ(t)(Lˆ(t)− Lθˆ(t))ν(dz)
+
∂Hˆ
∂pi
(t)(pˆi(t)− pi(t)). (23)
Combining (22), (23) and the condition (16), we conclude that
Jg(θˆ, pˆi)− Jg(θˆ, pi) ≥ E
[ ∫ T
0
∂Hˆ
∂pi
(t)(pˆi(t)− pi(t))dt
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
E
[∂Hˆ
∂pi
(t)(pˆi(t)− pi(t))
∣∣∣Gt]dt]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
E
[∂Hˆ
∂pi
(t)
∣∣∣Gt](pˆi(t)− pi(t))dt]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
∂
∂pi
E[Hˆ(t)|Gt](pˆi(t)− pi(t))dt
]
≥ 0. (24)
Since this holds for all pi ∈ ΠG , pˆi is optimal.
ii) Proceeding in the same way as in (i) we can show that if (ii) holds, then
Jg(θˆ, pˆi) ≤ Jg(θ, pˆi),
for all θ ∈ ΘG and θˆ is optimal.
iii) If both (i) and (ii) hold then
Jg(θˆ, pi) ≤ Jg(θˆ, pˆi) ≤ Jg(θ, pˆi),
for any (θ, pi) ∈ ΘG ×ΠG . Thereby
Jg(θˆ, pˆi) ≤ inf
θ∈ΘG
Jg(θ, pˆi) ≤ sup
pi∈ΠG
(
inf
θ∈ΘG
Jg(θ, pi)
)
.
On the other hand,
Jg(θˆ, pˆi) ≥ sup
pi∈ΠG
Jg(θˆ, pi) ≥ inf
θ∈ΘG
(
sup
pi∈ΠG
Jg(θ, pi)
)
.
Now due to the inequality
inf
θ∈ΘG
(
sup
pi∈ΠG
Jg(θ, pi)
) ≥ sup
pi∈ΠG
(
inf
θ∈ΘG
Jg(θ, pi)
)
we have
Jg(θˆ, pˆi) = sup
pi∈ΠG
(
inf
θ∈ΘG
Jg(θ, pi)
)
= inf
θ∈ΘG
(
sup
pi∈ΠG
Jg(θ, pi)
)
.
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3 A maximum principle for nonzero-sum games
with g–expectations
In this section, we study a nonzero sum stochastic differential games problem
with g–expectation. For notational simplification, we consider only two players;
it is similar for n players. The control system is given as before, which is
dX(t) = b(t,X(t), u0(t))dt+ σ(t,X(t), u0(t))dW (t)
+
∫
R0
γ(t,X(t−), u1(t−, z), z)N˜( dt, dz), t ∈ [0, T ], (25)
X(0) = x ∈ Rn.
Let u = (u0, u1) = (θ, pi), where θ = (θ0, θ1) and pi = (pi0, pi1) are controls for
player 1 and 2, respectively. Let G1t ⊆ Ft and G2t ⊆ Ft be two sub–filtrations,
representing the information available to player 1 and player 2, respectively, and
let ΘG1 , ΠG2 be the corresponding families of admissible control processes θ(t),
pi(t); t ∈ [0, T ]. We denote by J igi(θ, pi), i = 1, 2, the performance functionals
corresponding to the two players 1 and 2:
J igi(θ, pi) = Egi
[ ∫ T
0
fi(t,X(t), u(t)) dt+ hi(X(T ))
]
, i = 1, 2, (26)
where gi : [0, T ] × Rn × Rn × L2(ν) → R are given convex functions satisfying
(4). Thus Egi represents the preference of player i, i = 1, 2. The problem is to
find a control (θ∗, pi∗) ∈ ΘG1 ×ΠG2 such that{
J1g1(θ, pi
∗) ≤ J1g1(θ∗, pi∗), for all θ ∈ ΘG1 ;
J2g2(θ
∗, pi) ≤ J2g2(θ∗, pi∗), for all pi ∈ ΠG2 .
(27)
The pair of controls (θ∗, pi∗) is called a Nash equilibrium for the game. Note
that when player 1 (resp. 2) acts with the strategy θ∗ (resp. pi∗), the best that
2 (resp. 1) can do is to act with pi∗ (resp. θ∗).
We use the same method as in the previous section, but adapted to the new
situation. We now consider the following forward-backward SDEs:
dX(t) = b(t,X(t), u0(t))dt+ σ(t,X(t), u0(t))dW (t)
+
∫
R0 γ(t,X(t
−), u1(t−, z), z)N˜( dt, dz),
dY1(t) = −[g1(t,K1(t), L1(t, ·)) + f1(t,X(t), u(t))]dt
+K1(t)dW (t) +
∫
R0 L1(t, z)N˜(dt, dz),
dY2(t) = −[g2(t,K2(t), L2(t, ·)) + f2(t,X(t), u(t))]dt
+K2(t)dW (t) +
∫
R0 L2(t, z)N˜(dt, dz),
X(0) = X0, Y1(T ) = h1(X(T )), Y2(T ) = h2(X(T )).
(28)
The performance functionals J igi(θ, pi), i = 1, 2, now take the form:
J igi(θ, pi) = Yi(0)
= E
[
hi(X(T )) +
∫ T
0
(gi(t,Ki(t), Li(t, ·)) + fi(t,X(t), u(t)))dt
]
, i = 1, 2. (29)
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We want to find a Nash equilibrium for the game, i.e. a pair (θ∗, pi∗), such that
the inequalities (27) are satisfied.
Let us introduce two Hamiltonian functions associated with this game, namely
H1 and H2, as follows:
Hi : [0, T ]× Rn × Rn × Rn × L2(ν)×K ×K × Rn × Rn × Rn × L2(ν)→ R
are defined by
Hi(t, x, yi, ki, li, θ, pi, µi, ϕi, ψi, φi) = gi(t, ki, li) + fi(t, x, θ, pi)
+ (gi(t, ki, li) + fi(t, x, θ, pi))µi + b(t, x, θ, pi)ϕi
+ σ(t, x, θ, pi)ψi +
∫
R0
γ(t, x, θ, pi, z)φi(t, z)ν(dz), i = 1, 2. (30)
We assume that Hi is differentiable with respect to the variables x, yi, ki, li,
respectively. The adjoint equations in the unknown adapted processes µi, ϕi,
ψi and φi, i = 1, 2, is following FBSDE:
dµi(t) = ∂Hi∂y (t,X(t), Yi(t),Ki(t), Li(t), θ(t), pi(t), µi(t), ϕi(t), ψi(t), φi(, ·))dt
+ ∂Hi∂ki (t,X(t), Yi(t),Ki(t), Li(t), θ(t), pi(t), µi(t), ϕi(t), ψi(t), φi(, ·))dW (t)
+
∫
R05liHi(t,X(t), Yi(t),Ki(t), Li(t), θ(t), pi(t), µi(t), ϕi(t), ψi(t), φi(, ·))N˜(dt, dz),
dϕi(t) = −∂Hi∂x (t,X(t), Yi(t),Ki(t), Li(t), θ(t), pi(t), µi(t), ϕi(t), ψi(t), φi(, ·))dt
+ ψi(t)dW (t) +
∫
R0 φi(t, z)N˜(dt, dz),
µi(0) = 0, ϕi(T ) = (1 + µi(T ))h′i(X(T )).
(31)
The following result is a generalization of Theorem 2.1: (As in Section 2 we
let Θ and Π denote the set of possible control values of θ(t), t ∈ [0, T ] and pi(t),
t ∈ [0, T ], respectively.)
Theorem 3.1. Let (θˆ, pˆi) ∈ ΘG1 ×ΠG2 with corresponding state processes Xˆ(t),
Yˆ1(t) and Yˆ2(t). Suppose there exists a solution (ϕˆi(t), ψˆi(t), φˆi(t, z)), i = 1, 2,
of the corresponding adjoint equation (31) such that
max
pi∈Π
E[H1(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ1(t), Kˆ1(t), Lˆ1(t), θˆ(t), pi, µˆ1(t), ϕˆ1(t), ψˆ1(t), φˆ1(, ·))|G2t ]
= E[H1(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ1(t), Kˆ1(t), Lˆ1(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), µˆ1(t), ϕˆ1(t), ψˆ1(t), φˆ1(, ·))|G2t ],
(32)
and
max
θ∈Θ
E[H2(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ2(t), Kˆ2(t), Lˆ2(t), θ, pˆi(t), µˆ2(t), ϕˆ2(t), ψˆ2(t), φˆ2(, ·))|G1t ]
= E[H2(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ2(t), Kˆ2(t), Lˆ2(t), θˆ(t), pˆi(t), µˆ2(t), ϕˆ2(t), ψˆ2(t), φˆ2(, ·))|G1t ].
(33)
Moreover, suppose that, for all t ∈ [0, T ], Hi(t, x, yi, ki, li, θ, pi, µˆi, ϕˆi, ψˆi, φˆi) is
concave in x, yi, ki, li, θ, pi and hi(x) is concave in x, i = 1, 2. Then (θˆ(t), pˆi(t))
is a Nash equilibrium for the game.
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Proof. Proceeding as in proof of Theorem 2.1 we have
J1g1(θˆ, pˆi)− J1g1(θˆ, pi) = E
[
h1(Xˆ(T ))− h1(X θˆ(T ))
+
∫ T
0
{
gˆ1(t)− gθˆ1(t) + fˆ1(t)− f θˆ1 (t)
}
dt
]
= E[h1(Xˆ(T ))− h1(X θˆ(T )) + (Yˆ1(0)− Y θˆ1 (0))µˆ1(0)]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
{
Hˆ1(t)−H θˆ1 (t)−
(
(gˆ1(t)− gθˆ1(t) + fˆ1(t)− f θˆ1 (t))µˆ1(t)
− (bˆ(t)− bθˆ(t))ϕˆ1(t)− (σˆ(t)− σθˆ(t))ψˆ1(t)
−
∫
R0
(γˆ(t)− γθˆ(t))φˆ1(t, z)ν(dz)
)}
dt
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
−
(
5x Hˆ(t)(Xˆ(t)−X θˆ(t)) +5y1Hˆ(t)(Yˆ1(t)− Y θˆ1 (t))
+5k1Hˆ(t)(Kˆ1(t)−K θˆ1 (t)) +
∫
R0
5l1Hˆ(t)(Lˆ1(t)− Lθˆ1(t))ν(dz)
)
dt
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
(
(gˆ1(t)− gθˆ1(t) + fˆ1(t)− f θˆ1 (t))µˆ1(t) + (bˆ(t)− bθˆ(t))ϕˆ1(t)
+ (σˆ(t)− σθˆ(t))ψˆ1(t) +
∫
R0
(γˆ(t)− γθˆ(t))φˆ1(t, z)ν(dz)
)
dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
{
Hˆ1(t)−H θˆ1 (t)−
(
(gˆ1(t)− gθˆ1(t) + fˆ1(t)− f θˆ1 (t))µˆ1(t)
+ (bˆ(t)− bθˆ(t))ϕˆ1(t) + (σˆ(t)− σθˆ(t))ψˆ1(t)
+
∫
R0
(γˆ(t)− γθˆ(t))φˆ1(t, z)ν(dz)
)}
dt
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
{
Hˆ1(t)−H θˆ1 (t)−
(
5x Hˆ1(t)(Xˆ(t)−X θˆ(t))
+5y1Hˆ1(t)(Yˆ1(t)− Y θˆ1 (t)) +5k1Hˆ1(t)(Kˆ1(t)−K θˆ1 (t))
+
∫
R0
5l1Hˆ1(t)(Lˆ1(t)− Lθˆ1(t))ν(dz)
)}
dt
]
. (34)
Since H1 is concave in x, y1, k1, l1 and pi, we get,
E
[ ∫ T
0
(Hˆ1(t)−H θˆ1 (t))dt
]
≥ E
[ ∫ T
0
(
5x Hˆ1(t)(Xˆ(t)−X θˆ(t))
+5y1Hˆ1(t)(Yˆ1(t)− Y θˆ1 (t)) +5k1Hˆ1(t)(Kˆ1(t)−K θˆ1 (t))
+
∫
R0
5l1Hˆ1(t)(Lˆ1(t)− Lθˆ1(t))ν(dz) +5piHˆ1(t)(pˆi(t)− pi(t))
)
dt
]
. (35)
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Combining the above we get
J1g1(θˆ, pˆi)− J1g1(θˆ, pi) ≥ E
[ ∫ T
0
5piHˆ1(t)(pˆi(t)− pi(t))dt
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
E[5piHˆ1(t)(pˆi(t)− pi(t))|G2t ]dt
]
. (36)
On the other hand, the condition (32) gives,
E
[
5pi Hˆ1(t)(pˆi(t)− pi(t))|G2t
]
= (pˆi(t)− pi(t))5pi E[Hˆ1(t)|G2t ]pi=pˆi(t) ≥ 0. (37)
Hence
J1g1(θˆ, pˆi)− J1g1(θˆ, pi) ≥ 0. (38)
In the same way we show that
J2g2(θˆ, pˆi)− J2g2(θ, pˆi) ≥ 0, (39)
whence the desired result.
4 Application to finance
We now apply our result in the previous section to study the worst case model
risk management problem. Firstly, we recall the definition of the convex risk
measure and its relation to g–expectation.
Definition 4.1. Let F = Lp(P) for some p ∈ [1,∞]. A convex risk measure is
a functional ρ : F→ R that satisfies the following properties:
(i) (convexity) ρ(λX+(1−λ)Y ) ≤ λρ(X)+(1−λ)ρ(Y ); X,Y ∈ F, λ ∈ (0, 1),
(ii) (monotonicity) If X ≤ Y then ρ(X) ≥ ρ(Y ), X, Y ∈ F,
(iii) (translation invariance)
ρ(X +m) = ρ(X)−m, X ∈ F,m ∈ R.
To connect to the above theory we give another representation of the convex
risk measure in term of g–expectation:
Definition 4.2. The risk ρ(ξ) of random variable ξ ∈ L2(FT ,P) (ξ can be seen
as a financial position of a trader in a financial market) is defined by
ρ(ξ) := Eg[−ξ] := Y (0), (40)
where Y (0) is the value at t = 0 of the solution BSDE (5), but with ξ replaced
by −ξ.
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Suppose that the finance market consists of one risky finance asset, whose
unit price is denoted by S1(t), and one risk–free asset, whose price at time t
is denoted by S0(t). We use the following stochastic differential equation to
describe this financial market.
dS0(t) = r(t)S0(t)dt; S0(0) = 1,
dS1(t) = S1(t−)
[
α(t)dt+ β(t)dW (t) +
∫
R γ(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)
]
,
S1(0) > 0,
(41)
where r(t) is a deterministic function; α(t), β(t) and γ(t, z) are given Ft-
predictable functions satisfying the following integrability condition:
E
[ ∫ T
0
{
| r(s) | + | α(s) | +1
2
β(s)2
+
∫
R
| log(1 + γ(s, z))− γ(s, z) | ν(dz)
}
ds
]
<∞,
where T is fixed. We assume that
γ(t, z) ≥ −1 for a.a. t, z ∈ [0, T ]× R0,
where R0 = R\{0}. This model represents a natural generalization of the classi-
cal Black-Scholes market model to the case where the coefficients are not neces-
sarily constants, but allowed to be (predictable) stochastic processes. Moreover,
we have added a jump component. See e.g. [3] or [7] for discussions of such mar-
kets.
Let Gt ⊆ Ft be a given sub-filtration and pi(t) be a portfolio, representing
the fraction of the total wealth invested in the risky asset at time t. Then the
dynamics of the corresponding wealth process V (pi)(t) is
dV (pi)(t) = V (pi)(t−)
[
{r(t) + (α(t)− r(t))pi(t)}dt
+ pi(t)β(t)dW (t) + pi(t−)
∫
R γ(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)
]
,
V (pi)(0) = x > 0.
(42)
A portfolio pi is called admissible if it is a measurable ca`dla`g stochastic
process adapted to filtration Gt and satisfies
pi(t−)γ(t, z) > −1 a.s.
and ∫ T
0
{
| r(t) + (α(t)− r(t))pi(t) | +pi2(t)β2(t)
+ pi2(t)
∫
R
γ2(t, z)ν(dz)
}
dt <∞ a.s.
The requirement that pi should be adapted to the filtration Gt is a mathemat-
ical way of requiring that the choice of the portfolio value pi(t) at time t is
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only allowed to depend on the information (σ-algebra) Gt. The wealth process
corresponding to an admissible portfolio pi is the solution of (42), namely
V (pi)(t) = x exp
[ ∫ t
0
{r(t) + (α(t)− r(t))pi(t)− 1
2
pi2(t)β2(t)
+
∫
R
(ln(1 + pi(s)γ(s, z))− pi(z)γ(s, z))ν(dz)}ds
+
∫ t
0
pi(s)β(s)dW (s) +
∫ t
0
∫
R
ln(1 + pi(s)γ(s, z))N˜(ds, dz)
]
. (43)
Now we introduce a family Q of measures Qθ parameterized by processes
θ = (θ0(t), θ1(t, z)) such that
dQθ(ω) = Zθ(T )dP (ω) on FT ,
where {
dZθ(t) = Zθ(t−)[−θ0(t)dW (t)−
∫
R θ1(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)],
Zθ(0) = 1.
(44)
We assume that θ1(t, z) ≤ 1 for a.a. t,z and∫ T
0
{
θ20(s) +
∫
R
θ21(s, z)
}
ds <∞ a.s. (45)
If θ = (θ0(t), θ1(t, z)) satisfy
E[Zθ(T )] = 1, (46)
then Qθ is a probability measure. If, in addition,
β(t)θ0(t) +
∫
R
γ(t, z)θ1(t, z)ν(dz) = α(t)− r(t); t ∈ [0, T ], (47)
then dQθ(ω) = Zθ(T )dP (ω) is an equivalent local martingale measure. See e.g.
[7], Ch.1. But here we do not assume (47) holds.
The processes θ = (θ0, θ1) which are adapted to the sub–filtration Gt and
satisfy (45) and (46) are called admissible controls of the market. The families
of admissible controls θ is denoted by Θ.
The performance (risk) is now defined as follows:
Jg(θ, pi) := ρ(Zθ(T )V (pi)(T )) = Eg[−Zθ(T )V (pi)(T )]. (48)
We then introduce our problem to find (θ∗, pi∗) ∈ Θ×Π such that
Jg(θ∗, pi∗) = Eg[−Zθ∗(T )V (pi∗)(T )] = sup
θ∈Θ
(
inf
pi∈Π
Eg[−Zθ(T )V (pi)(T )]
)
. (49)
This is a stochastic differential game between the agent and the market. The
agent wants to minimal her risk over all portfolios pi and the market wants to
maximize the minimal risk of the agent over all “scenarios”, represented by all
probability measures Qθ; θ ∈ Θ.
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Put
dX(t) =
[
dX1(t)
dX2(t)
]
=
[
dZθ(t)
dV (pi)(t)
]
(50)
Similarly as in the previous section the corresponding state process for
X(t) = (Zθ(t), V (pi)(t)), Y (t) = Y (pi)(t), K(t) = K(pi)(t), L(t, z) = L(pi)(t, z)
in (11) becomes the following FBSDEs:
dX(t) =
[
0
V (pi)(t−){r(t) + (α(t)− r(t))pi}
]
dt
+
[ −Zθ(t)θ0(t)
V (pi)(t−)β(t)pi(t)
]
dW (t) +
[ −Zθ(t) ∫R θ1(t, z)
V (pi)(t−)pi(t)
∫
R γ(t, z)
]
N˜(dt, dz)
dY (t) = −g(t,K(t), L(t))dt+K(t)dW (t) + ∫R0 L(t, z)N˜(dt, dz),
X(0) =
[
1
V (0)
]
, Y (T ) = −Zθ(T )V (pi)(T ).
(51)
By (14) the Hamiltonian becomes
H(t, x, y, k, l, θ, pi, µ, ϕ, ψ, φ)
= g(t, k, l)(1 + µ) + x2{r(t) + (α(t)− r(t))pi}ϕ2 − x1θ0(t)ψ1
+ x2β(t)pi(t)ψ2 +
∫
R0
{−x1θ1(t, z)φ1(·, z) + x2pi(t)γ(t, z)φ2(·, z)}ν(dt, dz).
(52)
And the FBSDE of the adjoint processes is of the following form
dµ(t) = (1 + µ(t))
[
gk(t, k, l)dW (t) +
∫
R0 gl(t, k, l)N˜(dt, dz)
]
,
dϕ1(t) =
{
θ0(t)ψ1(t) +
∫
R0 θ1(t, z)φ1(t, z)
}
dt+ ψ1(t)dW (t)
+
∫
R0 φ1(t, z)N˜(dt, dz),
dϕ2(t) = −
{
(r(t) + (α(t)− r(t))pi(t))ϕ2(t) + β(t)pi(t)ψ2(t)
+
∫
R0 pi(t)γ(t, z)φ2(t, z)ν(dt, dz)
}
dt
+ψ2(t)dW (t) +
∫
R φ2(t, z)N˜(dt, dz),
µ(0) = 0, ϕ1(T ) = −(1 + µ(T ))V (pi)(T ), ϕ2(T ) = −(1 + µ(T ))Zθ(T ).
(53)
Let (θˆ, pˆi) be candidate for an optimal control and let Xˆ(t) = (Xˆ1(t), Xˆ2(t)),
Yˆ (t) be the corresponding optimal processes with corresponding solution µˆ(t),
ϕˆ(t) = (ϕˆ1(t), ϕˆ2(t)), ψˆ(t) = (ψˆ1(t), ψˆ2(t)), φˆ(t, ·) = (φˆ1(t, ·), φˆ2(t, ·)) of the
adjoint equations.
We first minimize the Hamiltonian E[H(t, x1, x2, y, k, l, θ, pi, µ, ϕ, ψ, φ) | Gt]
over all pi ∈ Π. This gives the following condition for a minimum point pˆi:
E
[
(α(t)− r(t))ϕˆ2(t) + β(t)ψˆ2(t) +
∫
R0
γ(t, z)φˆ2(t, z)ν(dt, dz)
∣∣∣Gt]
pi=pˆi(t)
= 0.
(54)
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And then we maximize E[H(t, x1, x2, y, k, l, θ, pi, µ, ϕ, ψ, φ) | Gt] over all θ ∈ Θ.
This gives the following condition for a maximum point θˆ = (θ0, θ1):
E[−Xˆ1(t)ψˆ1(t)|Gt]θ=θˆ(t) = 0, (55)
and ∫
R0
E[−Xˆ1(t)φˆ1(t, z)|Gt]θ=θˆ(t)ν(dz) = 0. (56)
We try a process ϕˆ1(t) of the form
ϕˆ1(t) = −f(t)(1 + µˆ(t))Xˆ2(t) (57)
with f is a deterministic differentiable function. And differentiating this, we get
dϕˆ1(t) = −(1 + µˆ(t))Xˆ2(t)
{
f ′(t) + f(t)[r(t) + (α(t)− r(t))pˆi(t)]
+ f(t)β(t)pˆi(t)gk(t, k, l) + f(t)pˆi(t)gl(t, k, l)
∫
R0
γ(t, z)ν(dt, dz)
}
dt
− ϕˆ1(t)
{
(gk(t, k, l) + β(t)pˆi(t))dW (t) +
∫
R0
(gl(t, k, l) + pˆi(t)γ(t, z))N˜(dt, dz)
}
.
(58)
Comparing this with the equation of ϕˆ1(t) in (53) by equating the dt, dB(t) and
N˜(dt, dz) coefficients respectively, we get
ψˆ1(t) = −ϕˆ1(t)(gk(t, k, l) + β(t)pˆi(t)),
φˆ1(t, z) = −ϕˆ1(t)(gl(t, k, l) + pˆi(t)γ(t, z)).
Substituting ψˆ1(t) and φˆ1(t, z) into (55) and (55) we get:
E
[
pˆi(t)
(
β(t)+
∫
R0
γ(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)
)
+gk(t, k, l)+
∫
R0
gl(t, k, l)N˜(dt, dz)
∣∣∣Gt] = 0.
(59)
Now we try process ϕˆ2(t) of the form
ϕˆ2(t) = −f(t)(1 + µˆ(t))Xˆ1(t). (60)
Differentiating this and then comparing the obtained equation with the equation
of ϕˆ1(t) in (53) by equating the dt, dB(t) and N˜(dt, dz) coefficients respectively,
we get
θˆ0(t)E[β(t) | Gt]−
∫
R
θˆ1(t, z)E[γ(t, z) | Gt]ν(dz)
= E[(α(t) | Gt]− r(t) + E
[
β(t)gk(t, k, l) +
∫
R0
γ(t, z)gl(t, k, l)ν(dz)|Gt
]
. (61)
We have proved:
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Theorem 4.3. The optimal portfolio pˆi ∈ Π for the agent is given by
E
[
pˆi(t)
(
β(t)+
∫
R0
γ(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)
)
+gk(t, k, l)+
∫
R0
gl(t, k, l)N˜(dt, dz)
∣∣∣Gt] = 0,
(62)
and the optimal measure Qθˆ for the market is to choose θˆ = (θˆ0, θˆ1) such that
θˆ0(t)E[β(t) | Gt]−
∫
R
θˆ1(t, z)E[γ(t, z) | Gt]ν(dz)
= E[(α(t) | Gt]− r(t) + E
[
β(t)gk(t, k, l) +
∫
R0
γ(t, z)gl(t, k, l)ν(dz)
∣∣∣Gt]. (63)
Remark. In the case when Et = Ft for all t and the cost function is expressed
by linear expectation of risk (i.e. g = 0), this was proved in [8]. In this case the
interpretation of this result is the following: The market maximizes the minimal
risk of the agent by choosing a “scenario” (represented by a probability law
dQθ = Zθ(T )dP ) which is an equivalent martingale measure for the market (see
(47)). In this case the optimal strategy for the agent is to place all the money
in the risk free asset, i.e. to choose pi(t) = 0 for all t. In our case an analogue
result is obtained except now the coefficients β(t), γ(t, z) and α(t) are replaced
by their conditional expectations E[β(t) | Gt], E[γ(t, z) | Gt], E[α(t) | Gt] and an
extra term in the formula (62) and (62) are caused by g–expectation.
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